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On the Role of Embodied Cognition in the Understanding and Use of Metonymy 
Jeannette Littlemore1 
 
Abstract 
The majority of the chapters in this book focus on the symbiotic relationship between 
embodied cognition and metaphor. In contrast, this chapter focuses on the relationship 
between embodied cognition and metonymy. It argues that metonymy is also embodied, but 
in a different way, and that the social, environmental, dynamic and developmental aspects 
of embodied cognition can be expected to play an important role in shaping metonymic 
meaning. It is suggested that the relative transparency of the role played by embodied 
cognition in metonymy creation is influenced by the presence of movement and emotion, 
with increases in the amount of movement and emotion leading to increases in the 
transparency of embodied cognition. Following Deignan, Littlemore and Semino (2013), it is 
also suggested that the transparency of the role played by embodied cognition is affected by 
features of the genre (communicative purpose, staging and discourse community 
membership) and the register (field, tenor and mode). 
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1. Introduction 
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A key claim in the embodied cognition hypothesis is that “people’s subjective, felt 
experience of their bodies in action provides part of the fundamental grounding for language 
and thought” (Gibbs 2003: 2). As other chapters in this book show, it follows from this that 
some metaphorical expressions will evoke actual bodily responses that correspond to the 
more basic or ‘literal’ senses of those expressions. Considerable empirical support has been 
found for this proposition, with numerous neuro-scientific experiments showing that 
metaphor comprehension does indeed often have a sensorimotor basis, particularly for 
those metaphors that have sensory source domains (Feldman & Naranayan 2004; Gibbs 
2014). For example, in (1), the word ‘grasp’ is used metaphorically to mean ‘understand’: 
 
(1) Swann displayed a much firmer grasp of the significance of socio-economic circumstances 
(BNC: FAY) 
 
Studies have demonstrated that when people hear metaphorical uses of words such as this, 
sensory-motor responses are triggered that correspond to those that would be triggered 
when hearing the more literal or ‘basic’ sense of the metaphors. For example, it has been 
shown that people comprehend metaphorical phrases, like ‘grasp the concept’ more quickly 
when they first make, or imagine making, a relevant bodily action, such as a grasping motion 
(Wilson & Gibbs 2007). As other chapters in this volume show, expressions such as this rely 
on correlational, primary metaphors which stem from an initial conflation of a perceptually 
defined concept and a subjective response to it, which later becomes dissociated (Grady 
1997, this volume). 
However, there have, to date, been no such empirical investigations into the embodied 
nature of metonymy. Whereas metaphor is often defined as involving some sort of similarity 
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or correlation between the source and target domain or idealized cognitive model (ICM), 
metonymy involves a relationship of contiguity, or in cognitive linguistic terms, it provides 
mental access to another part of the same domain or ICM, rather than evoking a different 
domain or ICM. It has been shown that primary metaphors have a metonymic basis, insofar 
as they begin life as metonymic extensions from bodily experiences, which are then 
projected onto abstract domains (Kövecses 2013). There is also work in gesture studies 
showing that gestural realisations of primary metaphors have a metonymic basis (Mittelberg 
& Waugh 2009). In these cases, one would expect metonymy to be embodied to some 
extent, by virtue of its association with embodied primary metaphor. However, no studies of 
the type described above have been conducted on metonymy when it stands alone, 
independent of metaphor. The principal reason for this is that metonymy does not relate 
concrete to abstract concepts in such a clear-cut way as metaphor, and therefore does not 
lend itself well to this kind of experimentation. We can see this in the following examples of 
metonymy: 
 
(2) a. Dickens is full of such characters (BNC: A06) 
b. you could boil your vegetables in the saucepan and boil the kettle at the same time 
(BNC: D8Y) 
c. when Germany defeated France and caused lasting resentment (BNC: CLX) 
 
In (2.a), ‘Dickens’ metonymically represents ‘stories written by Dickens’, the word ‘boil’ in 
(2.b) refers to the water containing the vegetables and the water in the kettle, respectively, 
and in (2.c) ‘Germany’ and ‘France’ refer to the German and French armies. Evidence from 
eye tracking studies has shown that when faced with metonyms such as these, participants 
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develop an underspecified, schematic representation of the word’s meaning and then home 
in on the appropriate sense (literal or metonymic) once sufficient contextual cues have been 
provided (Frisson & Pickering 1999). It is therefore not really relevant to ask whether any 
full-blown ‘literal’ meaning of the word is activated, and then to compare this with its 
metonymic sense—the two senses, or uses, are too close together in the first place. With 
metonymy, there are different questions to be asked when it comes to the role of embodied 
cognition. 
In order to explore the role played by embodied cognition in the processing of 
metonymy, it is necessary to draw on an extended definition of embodied cognition which 
incorporates an understanding of the fact that human cognition is not confined to the 
individual. Rather, it is shaped by one’s physical and social environment as well as one’s 
personal and social history. It is thus environmentally, socially and temporally ‘distributed’ 
(e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998; Semin & Cacioppo 2008; Zhang & Patel 2006; this volume: 
Jensen). The notion of distributed embodied cognition emphasizes the fact that embodied 
cognition takes place in a world populated by other people and things, and that it changes 
over time. It has the following three dimensions: 
(i) Environmental embodied cognition emphasizes the coordination between internal 
embodied cognition and the physical environment.  
(ii) Social embodied cognition emphasizes the distribution of embodied cognitive 
processes across the members of a social group. 
(iii) Dynamic/developmental embodied cognition, emphasizes the ways in which current 
cognitive processes are affected by earlier processes, and change over time.  
In sections 2, 3 and 4 of this chapter, I look at how each of these features of distributed 
embodied cognition is involved in the processing and production of metonymy. In section 5, 
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I discuss ways in which contextual features, such as genre and register, may affect the 
salience of embodied cognition within metonymy.  
 
 
2. Environmental Embodied Cognition 
 
Environmental embodied cognition emphasizes the relationship between internal embodied 
cognition and the physical environment. It takes as its starting point the fact that we 
understand things in terms of what they mean to us and how we can best make use of them 
or interact with them (Glenberg 1999). In this section, I explore four aspects of 
environmental embodied cognition that have a direct bearing on the processing of 
metonymy. These are: affordances, perceptual salience, part-whole processing, and 
cognitive off-loading.  
 
2.1. Affordances 
 
A number of scholars have pointed out that when we encounter an object, one of our first 
(automatic) responses is to think about what that object means to us and what we can use it 
for. In other words, we think about what the ‘affordances’ the object might offer us in terms 
of its purpose and function (Gibson 1979; Glenberg & Robertson 2000). Thus, if we see a 
chair we perceive of it first and foremost as something that we can sit on; if we see a glass, 
we understand it first and foremost as something that we can put liquid in, and drink from. 
This view of the physical world affects the way in which we use metonymy and the direction 
of the metonymy; the responses to the objects just described involve OBJECT FOR ACTION 
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and CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED metonymic relationships (e.g. Radden & Kövecses 1999). 
These relationships license linguistic metonyms, such as ‘would you like a glass?’ (meaning 
‘would you like a glass of wine?’). Affordances also license discourse-community specific 
metonyms, such as the utterance ‘you’ve got a foot there, out to the left’, which might be 
said by one climber to another to mean that there is a hold nearby where they can put their 
foot. Incidentally, the word ‘hold’ in this explanation is also metonymic, as it involves an 
ACTION FOR OBJECT relationship, which reflects a human affordance of the object in 
question.2 
There is some evidence to suggest that affordances such as these have a neuro-
physiological basis in that they generate corresponding synaptic connections in the brain 
(Bierwiaczonek 2013). In other words, certain clusters of neurons are specifically designed to 
relate the physical properties of objects to the most suitable cognitive motor programs that 
will allow us to interact with them manually in a purposeful way (Cuccio, this volume). Thus, 
when we see a teapot, or even a picture of a teapot, neuro-synaptic connections are 
activated so that we automatically prepare to take hold of the handle and pour the tea. 
Strong synaptic connections develop between the sight of the teapot and the action of 
making tea. It therefore follows that metonymic relationships which involve a link between 
PERCEPTION AND ANTICIPATED CORRESPONDING ACTION have a clear neurological 
substrate.  
Related studies have shown that if one concept is used to refer to another on a regular 
enough basis, a synaptic link will form between those two concepts, and this synaptic link 
will become stronger as the association between the two concepts becomes more 
conventionalized. For example, fMRI studies have shown that words denoting activities, such 
as ‘smile’, ‘hit’ or ‘kick’, activate the face, arm and leg regions in the motor and pre-motor 
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cortex (Hauk et al. 2004). Moreover, as infants, we develop powerful cause-effect 
relationships, which we then use to infer a cause from an effect and vice versa. For example, 
Michotte (1963) showed that if people see one object making contact with a second object 
and the second object then starts to move after a short delay, then they assume that the 
movement of the second object is the direct result of its contact with the first object, even if 
this is not the case. Similarly, when we hear a sound related to a particular action, the pre-
motor cortex associated with that action begins to fire (Kohler et al. 2002). These synaptic 
relationships are likely to underlie many RESULT FOR ACTION or CAUSATION metonyms 
(such as ‘the car screeched to a halt’). There is even evidence to suggest that these synaptic 
connections exhibit some of the characteristics of embodied cognition that were described 
in the introduction: the activation of a social stereotype has been shown to cause the 
unintended mimicry of behavior that is strongly associated with the stereotyped group. For 
example, if people are asked to think about old people, they are more likely to start to walk 
more slowly (Bargh et al. 1996). This finding suggests that some of the metonymic shorthand 
that underlies social stereotyping (here SALIENT FEATURE FOR CATEGORY) is embodied, in 
that it is both perceptual and conceptual. 
 
2.2 Perceptual salience 
 
A second aspect of environmental embodied cognition that is involved in metonymy 
creation is perceptual salience. When we survey our environment, some features will 
inevitably stand out more than others. This can be because of their distinct physical features 
(for example, if they are brightly colored, well delineated or moveable) or because they have 
particular relevance to us (for example, for a human viewer, in most situations, other 
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humans are more likely to stand out than animals or inanimate objects). The fact that we are 
more prone to notice things that are of immediate relevance to us, and that this drives the 
way we process information, is likely to play an important topic in our understanding of the 
role played by embodied cognition in metonymy production and comprehension. The 
phenomenon of perceptual salience explains why, for example, the metonym ‘being at the 
wheel’ is readily understood by speakers of English to mean ‘driving a vehicle’ (Littlemore 
2015), though the exact nature of the vehicle that is evoked (be it a car, a lorry, a tractor or 
even a boat) will depend on both the context and the hearer’s previous experience with 
different sorts of vehicles (Giora 1997).  
Perceptual salience also explains for example the choice of the words ‘summer’ and 
‘winter’ rather than ‘spring’ and ‘autumn’ to stand metonymically for the idea of an event 
occurring year round in the following example: 
 
(3) She always has a log fire in the hearth, summer and winter. (BNC: A61) 
 
Here, summer and winter are more perceptually salient in that they are respectively hotter 
and colder than spring and autumn, which is presumably why they are chosen as metonymic 
vehicles (Panther & Thornburg 2012). This phenomenon, in which two or three words stand 
for a larger entity, is referred to as ‘merism’ and is typical of ancient Hebrew poetry (Watson 
1986: 321).3 It has been found to be widespread in Chinese (Wu 2014), where, for example, 
the term ‘have young, have old, have tall, have short’ means ‘people of different ages and 
heights’. Similarly, ‘have long, have short’ means ‘all lengths’ and ‘have fat have thin’ means 
‘people of all sizes’. These expressions all focus on the people or objects that would be the 
most salient in a crowd or in a collection of items because they are the most extreme 
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instantiations. These extreme instantiations stand for the entire scale. There are also more 
abstract examples of this phenomenon in Chinese: ‘good, bad’ is used to refer to ‘quality’ 
and ‘cold, hot’ refers to ‘temperature’ (ibid.). The semantic interpretation of such 
expressions can be attributed to metonymic inferences triggered by the co-occurring 
antonym pairs. 
 
2.3 Part-whole processing 
 
A third aspect of environmental embodied cognition, which has been shown to play a key 
role in metonymy creation, is part-whole processing. In life, we rarely see the whole of an 
object in a single viewing: we usually only see it from a particular angle, and have to use our 
world knowledge to make assumptions about what the rest of the object will look like. As 
humans, we are very good at doing this. Gestalt psychologists have used a number of 
studies, both linguistic and non-linguistic to show that when pieces of information are 
missing from a pattern, people will complete the pattern for themselves, sometimes not 
even noticing that there are pieces missing. People only need to see parts of a shape such as 
a square or circle to recognize the whole shape intended. In a study designed to 
demonstrate the power of part-whole processing, Cutting and colleagues (1978) found that 
when people are taken into a dark room and asked to observe the movements of someone 
dressed in black, but with lights attached to various points of their body, they can tell what 
the person is doing, their gender and (if they know them), who the person is, simply by 
watching the movements of the lights. This finding reflects the strength of the PART-WHOLE 
schema in humans. We are able to perceive a whole object, scene or event, when we have 
only been shown parts, and we are able to use the whole object, scene or event to infer the 
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presence of parts that were not even there. This skill is necessary for us to understand and 
interact with our environment, as it is virtually impossible to view all aspects of an object, 
scene or event at the same time. These connections underlie two of the most basic 
metonymic relationships: the PART FOR WHOLE relationship and the WHOLE FOR PART 
relationship. These two relationships have been found to account for a substantial amount 
of the metonyms discussed in the literature (Radden & Kövecses 1999) and, according to 
some accounts, are thought to explain all cases of metonymy (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & 
Diez Velasco 2002). There is clearly a strong relationship between the ability to complete 
patterns (gestalts) and the ability to relate the functional parts of a complex entity to the 
entity itself, as both of these involve the ability to perceive and process part-whole 
relationships. 
I would like to end this section with an example of metonymy that displays the three 
aspects of environmental embodied cognition discussed thus far. In British Sign Language 
(BSL), the sign for ‘computer’ involves both hands being held next to each other in front of 
the body with palms facing down, with fingers wriggling up and down. This sign evokes the 
act of typing, which is perceptually the most salient act associated with a computer, and 
foregrounds what a human actually does with a computer, thus drawing attention to one of 
its main human affordances. There is also PART FOR WHOLE processing involved as typing is 
only one of the many things that one might associate with working on a computer. Others 
might include turning on the computer, clicking on the mouse button or looking at the 
screen.  
 
2.4. Cognitive off-loading 
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An important consequence of the environmental nature of embodied cognition is that it 
facilitates the off-loading of cognition onto physical or environmental artefacts. A good 
example of the role played by cognitive off-loading in metonymy can be found in Deignan et 
al.’s (2013) study of the language and gesture employed by a lecturer in International 
Development. In this study, the lecturer was explaining management models to two 
interlocutors, one of whom was a colleague (and therefore a member of the same 
professional discourse community), the other one was not. One of the models that she was 
explaining to the interlocutors was the ‘Competing Values Framework’. This model is used to 
describe different types of organizations in terms of how centralized or decentralized they 
are, and how inward or outward-focused they are. The lecturer illustrated this framework by 
means of a diagram which she drew on a flip chart before the arrival of the interlocutors. In 
this diagram, she drew the two variables sitting along two intersecting axes. Each of the four 
resulting quadrants represented a particular type of organization, namely: ‘bureaucracy’, 
‘human relations’, ‘open systems’ and ‘goal-oriented’. Organizations that were ‘open’ and 
‘outward-looking’ sat towards the top and the right of the diagram, whereas centralized and 
inward-looking organizations sat towards the bottom left.  
In both the exchanges, the lecturer described the framework by referring specifically 
to previous bosses in her department, with each boss metonymically representing one of the 
four styles of management. In both exchanges, the lecturer metonymically ‘off-loaded’ the 
management styles onto the diagram that she had drawn on the flip chart. She used the 
diagram metonymically to locate the bosses according to their management styles, pointing 
to various parts of the diagram and explaining to her interlocutor that the various heads of 
department were ‘definitely over here’, ‘over to this side’, ‘probably towards the left’, or 
that ‘we made loads of money when that boss was in charge’.  
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3. Metonymy and the social nature of embodied cognition 
 
Social embodied cognition, which involves the distribution of embodied cognitive processes 
across the members of a social group, is an important concept, as bodily experiences are 
interpreted very differently according to the socio-cultural meaning resources that are 
available to us (El Refaie 2014). These meaning resources provide the framework within 
which embodied experience is interpreted.  
There are a number of socially sanctioned ways of interpreting embodied metonymy, 
which affect what we do with our own bodies. One important factor is gender. In all 
languages, there are strong social conventions concerning what males and females are 
supposed to do with their bodies, and what these actions ‘mean’. In her study of the role 
played by body language in Dickens’ novels, Mahlberg (2013: pp112-113 ) shows how the 
term ‘standing with his back to the fire’ is often used to portray male characters in powerful 
positions. As Mahlberg points out, the fact that the fireplace is a prominent part of the room 
means that standing with one’s back to it puts these men in a prominent and powerful 
position. They are also, rather selfishly, absorbing all the warmth from the fire. Women, in 
contrast, are almost never portrayed as standing with their backs to the fire, but they are 
occasionally portrayed as sitting with their backs to the fire. There is only one instance in 
Dickens of a woman standing with her back to the fire, and this is Mrs. Pipchin, in the novel 
Dombey and Son, who runs a strict children’s boarding house, which she rules with a rod of 
iron. She is a widow and a ‘marvellous, ill-favoured, ill-conditioned old lady’: 
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(4) [...] and Mrs Pipchin, with her back to the fire, stood, reviewing the newcomers, like an old 
soldier. (‘Dombey and Son’, in The Works of Charles Dickens, Vol. III, New York: D. Appleton 
and Company, 1868, p. 44.) 
 
Mahlberg points out that by presenting Mrs Pipchin in a male pose, Dickens is emphasizing 
the fact that she is in charge, without a man in her life. These examples demonstrate the 
important role played by social embodied cognition in metonymy. Having one’s ‘back to the 
fire’ works as an embodied metonym for certain types of behavior and characteristics, but 
the precise meanings that are intended differ considerably according to gender, and 
according to whether the person is standing or sitting, and whether these meanings are 
socially sanctioned.  
In another example, Mahlberg (ibid.: p.102) compares occurrences of the act of 
‘putting a hand on one’s shoulder’ in the novel Nicholas Nickleby. When this action is carried 
out by male characters, it serves as metonymic shorthand for friendship, emphasis or 
control. In the one case where this act is carried out by a female character, it is used in the 
literal sense and the character (Mrs Snevellicci) is holding onto someone for physical support 
(ex 5). Again, there is evidence of embodied cognition in both cases, but the precise 
metonymic meanings that apply to each gender are determined by social conventions.  
 
(5) She actually laid her hand upon the shoulder of the manageress (Charles Dickens, The Life 
and Adventures of Nicholas Nickleby, Chapman and Hall, 1839, p. 288.) 
 
Another place where we can see the impact of socially-constructed body roles on 
metonymic thinking is in the area of ‘enclothed cognition’, the idea that one’s body schema 
can be extended to the clothes that one wears.4 For example, Adam and Galinsky (2012) 
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conducted a study in which they had participants complete an experimental task wearing a 
white lab coat. Half of the participants were told that it was a doctor’s coat and half were 
told that it was a painter’s coat. There are metonymic connections here between the coats 
and the types of people who wear them. The participants who were told that they were 
wearing a doctor’s coat performed the task with considerably more attentiveness than those 
who were told that they were wearing a painter’s coat. In a previous study these researchers 
had found that participants who had been asked to wear a lab coat outperformed those who 
were not asked to wear a lab coat. Their findings suggest that the behavior of the 
participants was affected by the symbolic meaning of the coat, as well as by the physical 
experience of wearing it. 
Social embodied cognition also operates in metonymic entailments of conceptual 
metaphors. We can see an example of this in Musolff’s (2013) comparison of the way in 
which the ‘body politic’ metaphor is exploited in English and Chinese. He found that English 
speakers conceptualize the political system as a body, following a hierarchical approach. In 
contrast to this, the Chinese also have the political system as a body, but the different cities 
are viewed as different parts of the body through a process of metonymic extension. For 
example, he found that Chinese participants in his study referred to Guangzhou as ‘the guts’ 
(‘where the peasants are perpetually bound to the soil’) and the ‘feet’; Tianjin as ‘the hands’ 
(‘because there is manufacturing’); Shenzhen as ‘the eyes’, and Tibet as ‘the stomach’ 
(‘because it makes Chinese people feel uncomfortable’). Thus we have metonymic links in 
the source domain of the metaphor (for more on this point, see Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez 
2014, this volume), with the focus of the cities and their respective contributions to the 
Chinese economy being grafted onto the ‘body politic’ metaphor.  
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4. Metonymy and the dynamic/developmental nature of embodied cognition 
 
Embodied cognition is by no means stable, straightforward or permanently fixed in early 
childhood. It is more appropriately viewed as a highly complex, dynamic and developmental 
process, whose nature varies according to the specific situations in which we find ourselves, 
and the extent to which we are consciously aware of our bodies at any given moment. The 
nature of our embodied cognition is also likely to develop as we grow older. The dynamic/ 
developmental view of embodied cognition therefore encapsulates its characteristics as 
both a developmental and an adaptive process. In any study of the way embodied cognition 
impacts on the way we use metonymy, we need to consider how it changes over time and in 
accordance with changing circumstances. 
We can see evidence of the developmental nature of embodied cognition in the 
comprehension of metonymy by young foreign language learners. Piquer Piriz (2005) 
explored how 5, 7, 9 and 11 year-old Spanish learners of English understood and reasoned 
about the meanings of figurative extensions of the words ‘head’, ‘hand’ and ‘mouth. She 
found that the children’s reasoning strategies varied significantly according to their ages. Her 
findings for the word ‘head’ are particularly interesting. She discovered that, in comparison 
with younger children (aged 5 and 7), who reasoned metaphorically, using a vertical schema, 
with the head at the top, the older children (aged 9 and 11) displayed a strong tendency to 
reason metonymically using the BODY PART FOR FUNCTION (i.e. HEAD FOR GIVING ORDERS) 
metonymic relationship. Whilst this metonymic reasoning was helpful in interpreting 
expressions that were congruent with that schema, expressions that were incongruent with 
the schema (for example ‘head of the stairs’) were more likely to be misunderstood by the 
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older children than by the younger children. This particular expression was understood 
correctly by 82% of the 7 year-olds, but only 58% the 11 year-olds. Piquer Piriz found that 
the deployment of preferred reasoning strategies gave rise to correct and incorrect 
responses at all ages. These findings show that children’s domain knowledge develops as 
they experience more bodily and psychological interactions with the world, and these 
interactions make some metonymic relationships more accessible. However, although the 
children’s domain knowledge becomes more elaborate as their knowledge of the world 
increases, the elaborate nature of this knowledge is not always advantageous. Piquer Piriz’s 
finding complements findings from laboratory studies (e.g. Rundblad & Annaz 2010) in that 
it emphasizes the complex and developmental nature of metonymic reasoning. 
I would like to close this section with an example that not only displays the dynamic 
nature of embodied cognition in relation to metonymy, but also reflects the other two 
characteristics of embodied cognition just discussed. In other words, the metonymic 
meaning in this example appears to be shaped by the environmental, social and dynamic 
features of embodied cognition. In British English, the words ‘upstairs’ and ‘downstairs’ can 
be used to refer respectively to ‘bosses’ and ‘workers’. In the Bank of English (BofE) corpus, 
bosses are nearly always ‘upstairs’ and workers are nearly always ‘downstairs’ (ex 6, taken 
from Deignan et al. 2013: 179): 
 
(6) a. … whizz kid managers ‘upstairs’ don’t take any notice of experienced people. 
b. Tell them downstairs that I have specifically requested you. 
c. If the upstairs don’t get you the downstairs will. 
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We do not know whether in practice, managers are more likely than workers to be located 
upstairs rather than on the ground floor, although a simple Google search for the expression 
‘the boss upstairs’ yields three times as many hits as ‘the boss downstairs’; and the 
expression ‘the manager upstairs’ yields twice as many hits as ‘the manager downstairs’. The 
fact that usage tends to reflect what is actually the case, suggests that there is a complex 
interaction between real social experience (including the role of the vertical axis in 
buildings), and the embodied metonymies drawing directly on it. In addition, a range of 
primary metaphors coherently map the UP/ DOWN image schema onto the social hierarchy 
(POWER IS UP, STATUS IS UP, CONTROL IS UP), presumably reinforcing the power of the 
metonyms (see also Matlock & Winter, this volume).  
This interaction is likely to be motivated by the environmental, social and dynamic 
features of embodied cognition. The environmental contribution to this apparently 
‘embodied’ metonymy accounts for the relationship between the location of the individuals 
and who they are. However, as we have just seen, the explanation does not get us very far, 
because it does not account for the fact that we are more likely to refer to the bosses as 
‘upstairs’ even when in reality, they are just as likely to be located downstairs. In order to 
explain this pattern, we need to appeal to the social and dynamic features of embodied 
cognition.  
The social contribution comes from the British Class system, and the idea of the manor 
house, where the rich owners lived upstairs (possibly for reasons of security) and their 
servants lived downstairs. This arrangement has arguably been reinforced in the national 
consciousness by the popularity of British television costume dramas, such as ‘Upstairs 
Downstairs’, and more recently, ‘Downton Abbey’, where, week after week, viewers are 
exposed to this spatial and class division.5 Programs such as these may serve to ‘distribute’ 
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this particular metonymy amongst British speakers of English thus reinforcing our existing 
cultural schemas. Interestingly, these metonymic usages appear to be virtually non-existent 
in American English. A search of 200 corpus lines containing the term ‘upstairs’ in the 
Contemporary Corpus of American English (COCA) reveals no such uses of the term. A search 
of 200 corpus lines containing the term ‘downstairs’ reveals only one instance, and, 
somewhat ironically, this is a reference to the British costume dramas ‘Downton Abbey’ and 
‘Upstairs Downstairs’: 
 
(7) The wealthy and upper-class folks of Downton Abbey and Upstairs Downstairs long ago 
outsourced their kitchen and scullery work to downstairs staff. (COCA: 2011 MAG) 
 
The dynamic contribution comes from the time lag between a time in Britain, when people 
really did live like this, and nowadays, where, for the most part, they do not. Deignan (2003) 
has shown that there is often an indirect link between figurative expressions and the culture 
they represent.  
In this section, we have seen how the environmental, social and dynamic features of 
embodied cognition shape its role in metonymy. The extent to which these different 
features are highlighted in metonymy is likely to depend on a number of factors, such as the 
context in which the metonym is used, one’s reasons for using it, and the relationship 
between the individuals who are using it. In different contexts, one would expect to find 
considerable variation concerning the intensity and transparency of the role played by 
embodied cognition in the creation of metonymy. In some instances, the role will be clear, in 
others it will be harder to identify. In the following section, I explore some of these 
contextual factors. 
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5. The influence of genre and register on the transparency of embodied metonymy 
 
The range of ways in which language use varies according to context is encapsulated by the 
notions of ‘genre and ‘register’. Genre and register have a significant effect on the ways in 
which both metaphor and metonymy are used (Deignan et al. 2013). Deignan et al propose a 
framework for analysis, which allows for an accurate and complete description of the ways 
in which figurative language use is shaped by the genre and register in which it appears. 
They illustrate the effectiveness of this framework by applying it to a range of datasets that 
vary in terms of genre and register. In this section, I draw on examples from different 
datasets to show how the transparency of the role played by embodied cognition in 
metonymy is shaped by both genre and register. Although I do not conduct a detailed 
analysis of a single dataset, using Deignan et al’s framework, I do make use of the essential 
elements of the framework. That is to say, I focus on the three defining characteristics of 
genre (communicative purpose, staging and discourse community) and the three defining 
characteristics of register (field, tenor and mode).  
The three defining characteristics of a genre are its discourse community, its 
communicative purpose and the way in which ideas are staged (Swales 1990). The three 
identifying characteristics of a register are its ‘field’ (what is being talked about), its ‘tenor’ 
(the relationship between the interlocutors) and its ‘mode’ (whether it is written, spoken, 
visual or gestural, and whether the language is ancillary or constitutive) (Halliday, 1985). 
Although to date no studies have directly investigated the ways in which genre and register 
affect the transparency of the role played by embodied cognition in metonymy, a number of 
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findings do point towards some possible patterns. In this section, I examine these findings 
and propose some tentative hypotheses concerning the ways in which the salience of 
embodied cognition within metonymy might be affected by genre and register.  
 
5.1 Genre 
 
Communicative purpose 
Beginning with genre, an example of the way in which the embodied nature of metonymy 
appears to vary according to communicative purpose can be found in Hodder and 
Houghton’s (2014) study, in which they compared the language used on Twitter by the 
British University and College Union (UCU) during strike periods with the language used 
during non-strike periods. During non-strike periods, the main communicative purposes of 
UCU Tweets are to create and develop a feeling of community, to relay news of what is 
happening in different universities across the UK, and to maintain and increase membership 
of the union. During strike periods, the Tweets serve more as a ‘call to action’, in which 
members are exhorted to join the strike. Using corpus linguistic techniques, Hodder and 
Houghton found that during strike periods, there was a significant increase in the number of 
words that related to the human body, including action words. The majority of the words in 
this category were used metonymically and appeared to involve explicit references to the 
body, in such a way as to imply that embodied cognition is involved (ex 8).  
 
(8) a. Want to know just how much money our universities are sitting on? 
b. Another big shout out to all our pickets this morning 
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c.  To those Vice Chancellors who say they’d like to pay their employees more, you know 
where the phone is. 
 
The use of metonymy in all of these tweets adheres to Radden and Kövecses’ (1999) ‘human 
over non-human’ principle of vehicle selection, which is inspired by Langacker’s (1991; 306-
7) ‘empathy hierarchy’, which places humans above physical objects in terms of their 
potential to attract empathy, and by extension attention. The first tweet personifies the 
universities, allowing them to be construed as living organisms that can physically ‘sit on’ 
money, and thus involves a metaphtonymy (see Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez 2014, this volume). 
The second contains a cause for effect metonymy in which the word ‘shout’ is used to 
indicate a desire for a large number of people to hear and respond to the message being 
conveyed, and the third refers a hypothetical ‘phone’ via an OBJECT FOR ACTION metonym; 
it is highly unlikely that a Vice Chancellor would, in person get on the phone to the UCU. 
These metonyms are all emotive to some extent. What we have here is a possible indication 
that embodied metonymy is likely to be more prevalent in instances where there is high 
emotional intensity. The ‘physicality’ in the text reflects this intensity of feeling. There are 
also elements of personification in these texts, which also underscore the embodied nature 
of metonymy. 
One possible explanation for the sudden increase in the salience of embodiment in 
these metonyms relates to the physical relationship between metonymy and motion itself. 
When our bodies are actually moving, or when we are witnessing or talking about 
movement, the language that we use reflects that movement (El Refaie 2014). Evidence for 
this contention can be found in the large amount of embodied metonymy that exists in 
football commentary (Levin 2008). Deignan et al. (2013: 191-229) also analyzed figurative 
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language use in texts produced by a group of people associated with a children’s football 
club, comparing the language used by supporters standing on the touchline at the matches 
with that used in the online post-match reports. They were thus comparing two related 
genres with slightly different communicative purposes. They found that twice as much 
metonymy was used by the supporters (although the figures were low in both corpora). 
Much of this metonymy appears to have involved embodied cognition in the broad sense 
discussed in Section 1. For example, they found that in the supporters’ discourse the players 
were frequently defined metonymically by their position on the pitch, as in the following 
example (ex 9, cf. ibid. 211): 6 
 
(9) Matthew, you’re centre midfield  
 
Here the centre of the pitch is used metonymically (via a PLACE FOR PERSON relationship) to 
stand for the player who is supposed to be based there. 
They also found that the word ball was often used metonymically (via an OBJECT FOR 
ACTION relationship) to refer to an especially good piece of play, or to a missed opportunity 
for good play (ex 10, cf. ibid.: 214). There were also some hyperbolic uses of metonymy (ex 
11, cf. ibid.): 
 
(10) Boys that was a great ball, and we’re not attacking it 
(11) Patrick, Patrick, Patrick, stand on it   
 
In ex 11, the boys are being exhorted to get near the ball, rather than actually ‘on’ it. Here an 
extreme action metonymically represents a related, less extreme action. The exaggerated 
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feel of the utterances reflects the urgency of the situation, and makes the embodied feel of 
the utterances even more salient. The increased salience of the embodied cognition 
underlying these metonyms is likely to be related both to the overall communicative 
purpose of the genre (to exhort the children to play well) and to the fact that it involves a 
need for immediate action. 
 
Stage 
Evidence for the effect of the stage of the genre on the transparency of embodied cognition 
within metonymy can be found in Deignan et al’s (2013: 128-164) study of an academic 
exchange, discussed in Section 2. They found that in both of the exchanges, dense clusters of 
metonymy were found towards the end of the exchange, and in both cases, these clusters 
served a summing-up function, drawing together themes that had been covered in the 
earlier part of the discussion. Similar findings have been made for metaphor by researchers 
looking at academic lectures (Corts & Pollio 1999; Low et al. 2008), reconciliation talk 
(Cameron 2007) and religious sermons (Corts & Meyers 2002). These researchers identified 
dense clusters containing both metaphor and metonymy, which were found at the end of 
the lecture or sermon, and whose purpose was to combine the various threads that have 
been proposed during the lecture or homily into a kind of summing up paragraph. These 
clusters were often accompanied by increased levels of gesture use (Corts & Meyers 2002; 
Corts & Pollio 1999).  
These findings are also partially mirrored by findings in English Literature. Toolan 
(2015) observes that, at the end of a short story or novel, we often find a powerful passage, 
in which the key ideas are summed up, with references back to earlier themes. When 
commenting on the typical characteristics of these passages, he observes that, among other 
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things, they include a high density of lexical and structural repetition and para-repetition, 
picking up on themes that have occurred previously in the novel, strong internal rhythms, a 
slight confusion caused by a loss of grammaticality, words and feelings of strong intensity 
and single sentences that combine an externally reported event with a report of the 
protagonists’ state of mind. Most importantly, Toolan reports such passages have a high 
emotional intensity. Example (12) provides one of the passages used by Toolan to illustrate 
his point: 
 
(12) She’d thought it was touch. Mouths, tongues, skin, bodies, banging bone on bone. 
Inflammation. Passion. But that wasn’t what had been meant for them at all. That was child’s 
play, compared to how she knew him, how far she’d seen into him, now. (“Passion”, Alice 
Munro, Runaway, London: Vintage Books 2006) 
 
The first sentence in this passage contains a number of metonyms whose embodied nature 
is highly transparent. This is also true of some of the other passages he discusses. The 
italicised body part metonyms work together to build a vivid scene; a scene that has been at 
the back of the protagonist’s mind throughout the second half of the story. The scene is then 
negated in the following sentence. The salience of embodied cognition within these 
metonyms provides extra force to this already powerful summing-up passage.  
 
Discourse-community membership 
In order to focus on discourse-community membership, we need to return to Deignan et al’s 
(2013: 128-164) study of academic conversations. Amongst other things, they observed that 
whereas the colleague picked up on the metonyms and used them to extend the discussion 
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of different management styles, the outsider failed to do so. The shared use of metonymy 
here appears both to have resulted from, and perhaps helped to develop a sense of shared 
understanding between the lecturer and her colleague. Similarly, in their football study, they 
found that many of the embodied uses of metonymy had meanings that were specific to 
that particular discourse community, and that were different from mainstream meanings. 
 
5.2 Register 
 
Register can also affect the transparency of the role played by embodied cognition in 
metonymy. Deignan et al (ibid.: 191-229), in their football study found higher levels of 
metonymy in the supporters’ discourse than in the match reports, which they attributed to 
the fact that the language in the former was spoken and ancillary, and that there was a need 
for rapid communication. These factors may also have contributed to the embodied feel of 
the metonyms used in this context. The increased salience of embodiment may also have 
resulted from the fact that the tenor was more informal and the mode was more ancillary; 
there was also a high level of immediacy to this situation, the metonymy being in and of the 
moment. Moreover, the relationship between the parents (mostly fathers) on the touchline 
to the children was more familiar, less formal, and less hierarchical than the relationship 
between the manager and the players. The field of the discourse may also have increased 
the salience of embodied cognition within the metonyms used: the focus is very much on 
the action, and action is, by necessity, embodied. Finally, as with the UCU Tweets mentioned 
above, there is a high level of emotional intensity in these ‘calls to action’; many of the 
fathers are highly competitive; they want to see their sons win the match, levels of ‘personal 
involvement’ are high. 
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Mode 
Of all the genre and register features likely to affect the degree to which embodied cognition 
is salient in metonymy, the strongest is probably mode. The embodied nature of metonymy 
is much more visible in modes of expression that involve the body, such as gesture 
(Mittelberg & Waugh 2009), sign language (Taub 2004) and dance (Gibbs 2014) than it is in 
spoken or written language, simply because these forms of communication involve the body 
itself. A good example of the transparency of embodied cognition in metonymy in gesture 
can be found in the data used by Deignan et al. (2013) in their aforementioned study of 
academic communication. Although they do not report it in their chapter, there is an 
interesting episode in which the lecturer imitates the act of writing really small letters  in 
order to illustrate the activity of  ‘doing paper trails’. Here, the most salient, physical action 
metonymically represents the complex process with which it is associated. 
Müller (this volume) demonstrates how the use of gesture can foreground, and thus 
intensify the ‘metaphoricity’ of an expression or an entire passage by emphasizing the 
embodied nature of the metaphor. Here we see a similar phenomenon with respect to 
metonymy. Moreover, within these modes of expression, when a communicator becomes 
more passionate about the topic, the metonymic gestures, signs and dance movements 
become bigger and more elaborate, thus making the role played by embodied cognition in 
the creation of metonymy even more transparent.  
In this section, I have proposed a number of hypotheses concerning ways in which 
genre and register features may affect the transparency of the role played by embodied 
cognition in the creation of metonymy. In addition to genre and register features, the 
amount of movement (or motion), and by extension the amount of emotion that is involved, 
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are both likely to affect the transparency of the role played by embodied cognition in the 
creation of the metonyms that are being employed.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
I have looked at a number of ways in which metonymy is likely to be motivated by embodied 
cognition. I have shown how a broader, extended notion of embodied cognition allows us to 
focus on its environmental, social, dynamic and developmental features, and to explore the 
ways in which these features manifest themselves, in different ways, in metonymy.  I have 
also suggested a number of ways in which the involvement of motion, and the intensity of 
emotion may increase the transparency of the role played by embodied cognition in the 
creation of metonymy. Finally, I have shown how this relationship is mediated by genre and 
register. More research in this field should be conducted in order to shed further light on the 
fundamental question of how and why we think and communicate using metonymy. 
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Notes 
 
1  I would like to thank John Barnden and Fiona MacArthur for their extremely useful feedback on 
an earlier version of this chapter. 
2  Joe and Oscar Malt, personal communication. 
3  Thank you to Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza for this observation. 
4  Cuccio (this volume) provides an extended discussion of the notions of ‘body schema’ and 
‘body image’. 
5  Fiona MacArthur, personal communication. 
6  In these examples, which are taken from Deignan et al. (2013), solid underlining denotes 
metaphor and dotted underlining denotes metonymy. 
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